Intervention Magazine asks: The Transition Meltdown and 9/11–Is There a Connection?
On September 4, 2001, more than two months after Louis Freeh?s last day as FBI director, Robert Mueller finally took his oath of office and settled into his new job at the J. Edgar Hoover building. One week later, four passenger airplanes smashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and an open field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing 3,000 people in the worst terrorist attack ever in U.S. history. This week, the U.S. Congress opens an investigation into how the sprawling U.S. intelligence community–both foreign and domestic–completely failed to predict, let alone stop, 9/11. (by Lowell Feld)
As Congress investigates the obvious intelligence meltdown which occurred leading up to 9/11, there?s another meltdown that?s been getting almost no attention in the media or in Congress: the completely dysfunctional transition process from one Presidential Administration to the next. Just to cite one startling statistic: as Mohamed Atta and friends boarded their flights that fateful September morning, only 227 of 508 (45%) of the Bush Administration?s top political positions had been filled, and 106 of these had been on the job for less than 8 weeks–barely enough time for a new political appointee to find the snack bar, let alone take charge of a sprawling bureaucracy or become proficient in his job.
Moving at a Snail?s Pace Just Won?t Cut It in Today?s Dangerous World
This snail?s pace may have worked all right during the 18th and 19th centuries, but in today?s world, it?s risky, if not downright dangerous. Essentially, this was the conclusion of a blue-ribbon task force chaired by former U.S. Senators John Culver, Democrat of Iowa, and Charles McC. Mathias, Republican of Maryland. In the fall of 1996, the task force issued a report that blasted the entire confirmation process as ?plagued by a range of problems that prevent the public from being served.? The report concluded that because the average length of time to confirm nominees has grown so long–to more than eight months–new administrations are unable to function at full capacity for a longer and longer period of time. And the 1996 task force didn?t even take into account that a Presidential transition process could lose more than a month of precious time in order to settle a disputed election. But that?s exactly what happened in 2000, with weeks of counting and recounting ?dimpled chad? ballots in Florida (the same state where, coincidentally, Mohamed Atta was busy getting his pilot?s license). Did the painfully slow transition from the outgoing Clinton Administration to the incoming Bush Administration contribute in any way to a glaring, government-wide failure to predict and prevent 9/11? Who knows, but one thing is for certain: while our democracy was going about its unhurried business, taking months on end to figure out who won the 2000 election, and then taking months more to transition to a new administration, the 9/11 terrorists were moving busily ahead with their terrible plans.
Just a short list of other high-level vacancies in top Administration posts leading up to 9/11 illustrates the problem: 1) the Transportation Department?s Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs (Read Van de Water, confirmed September 21, 2001, nearly 2 weeks after 9/11); 2) the Defense Department?s Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy (Jack Dyer Crouch II, confirmed August 1, 2001, only 6 weeks before 9/11); 3) FEMA?s Deputy Director (Michael D. Brown, announced 12/3/01, still not confirmed) and Associate Director for Preparedness (still nobody even announced); and 4) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner (James Ziglar, confirmed July 31, 2001, only 6 weeks before 9/11). Could any of these people have made a difference if they had been confirmed and in office in February or March of 2001? Well, since we can?t rerun history we?ll never know for certain, but having said that, the answer to this question has got to be: yes, it?s a frightening possibility!
Bureaucracies Are Important, But They Can?t Do Everything
It is important to note that the U.S. system of government specifically provides for a permanent, career civil service (the ?bureaucracy?) to provide continuity and institutional memory as Presidents and political parties come and go. And although this system works fairly well for the most part, it does have its weaknesses. For one thing, without political direction, bureaucracies tend to run on automatic pilot, not making any key policy decisions or initiating any major policy, organizational, or procedural changes, even if they are urgently needed. It?s not really the fault of the bureaucrats, it?s simply not their job to do these things–that?s what we?ve got political appointees for. Another problem with bureaucratic inertia comes in periods of serious national crisis, war, or other grave threats. At times like this, the natural transition bumpiness between administrations can turn into a serious crack, even a dangerous chasm. This is further exacerbated when there is a change in partisan control of the White House and/or Congress. It takes time for new politicals and old bureaucrats to get to know each other, to learn to trust and respect each other, and to ramp up to peak efficiency. Unfortunately, in the months leading up to 9/11, this process had barely gotten under way.
While Nero Fiddled?
Let?s take the 10 weeks in which the FBI had only an ?acting? director, for instance, when–it can be presumed–the agency was running on inertial guidance. During this same period of time: 1) 9/11 hijacking ringleader Mohamed Atta traveled to Las Vegas, met two other hijackers and most probably finalized details of the 9/11 hijackings (June 29-July 1); 2) Atta flew to Madrid and traveled all over Spain, apparently meeting with several members of bin Laden?s al-Qaeda terror network (July 7-July 19); 3) the so-called ?Phoenix Memo? was sent to FBI headquarters and ignored (July 10); 4) Atta entered the United States for the last time (July 19); 5) Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested on immigration charges and his computer seized after a suspicious flight school instructor contacted the Minneapolis FBI office (August 16); 6) information was received from French intelligence that Moussaoui had links to bin Laden’s al Qaeda network (August 28); 7) Mohamed Atta bought two tickets on the internet for American Airlines Flight 11, one for himself and one for Abdul Aziz Al-Omari (August 28); and 8) FBI agents in Minneapolis asked for a special warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to search Moussaoui?s computer and telephone records, but were rebuffed–not once, but twice (late August/early September). Would it have mattered if the complete Bush Administration team had been in place during this period? Could one of these people have taken an action that made a difference in any of these cases? To put it bluntly: did the lack of key people in key positions contribute to intelligence information ?falling between the cracks? in the crucial weeks leading up to 9/11? Whatever the answer, the mere possibility should be completely unacceptable to anyone thinking American.
Stop Wasting the FBI?s Time
Meanwhile, as if the agonizingly slow pace of Senate confirmations weren?t bad enough, there was another significant problem related to the transition process in the months leading up to 9/11. Specifically, during this period of time, precious FBI resources were being used to conduct extensive background checks on hundreds of political appointees. Did this distract FBI attention from its core mission? Again, the 1996 task force report appears to have hit the nail right on the head, decrying the drain on FBI resources caused by the requirement that it conduct so-called ?full-field investigations? on all top-level political appointees, even for positions not considered ?highly sensitive? (the vast majority). The task force concluded, correctly, that this resulted in ?a large and inefficient allocation of FBI resources that could be applied to better purposes.? Now that?s an understatement! What the task force really is saying here is that it?s completely ridiculous for the FBI to be spending its time checking on illegal nannies and other trivialities instead of doing its real job–catching terrorists and criminals! In order for the FBI to be able to do its real job, the task force strongly suggested that the whole routine investigative function for political appointees be taken away from the FBI and given to a ?small, new agency created for the primary purpose of performing [it].? An excellent idea that should be acted upon ASAP.
As is normally the case with blue-ribbon commissions in Washington, DC, the 1996 task force produced many excellent, eminently sensible recommendations. Unfortunately, as is also normally the case with blue-ribbon commissions in Washington, DC, its fine recommendations were completely ignored. But, imagine if these recommendations had not been ignored, and instead had been in effect during 2000 and 2001. In that case, it is highly likely that President Bush?s top people all could have been on the job within a month or two of Inauguration Day, leaving almost no gap between the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Then, at least the US agencies and people tasked with combating terrorism could have had a fighting chance to learn their jobs and start to do something, instead of languishing in confirmation purgatory for months on end–as the terrorists plotted, trained, exited and entered our country, bought their airplane tickets, and ultimately succeeded in killing 3,000 Americans.
Either We Get Our Act Together?or Else
The bottom line is that we?ll never know whether the ponderous, dysfunctional transition from the Clinton Administration to the Bush Administration contributed to al-Qaeda?s successful attack on America, September 11, 2001. However, we can say for sure that the U.S. Presidential transition process contains serious flaws, and that in today?s world these flaws can lead to adverse, even disastrous, consequences for the United States. Just imagine for a moment if all (or at least most) top-level Bush Administration officials were in place during the months leading up to 9/11. Maybe this would not have made a difference ultimately, or altered the course of events leading up to 9/11, but all it might have taken was for one of them to have noticed a problem, for one of them to have asked a key question at a critical moment, for one of them to have pressed for answers, or for one of them to have broken a key bureaucratic logjam somewhere. Tragically, for the 3,000 Americans killed on September 11, none of them did so, at least in part because many of them were not yet on the job. If we are to avoid future disasters like 9/11, we?ve got to do better than this as a nation. Either we get our act together fast, or the terrorists will show us–again–what happens when we don?t.
Lowell Feld is a freelance writer living in Washington, DC. He holds a Master’s Degree in Middle East Studies and is an economist specializing in international energy issues. Lowell is a contributing editor of Intervention Magazine.